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ability and fitness for a particular
purpose and for breach of an express warranty. Under the Connecticut Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC"), a party may only
recover breach of warranty damages against a seller or a merchant.
Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42a-2-313 2-315 (1985). The Connecticut
UCC defined a seller as a "person
who sells or contracts to sell
goods." Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 42a-2103(l)(d) (1985). The court previously held that GM was not in the
business of selling Dexron II. Thus,
the court concluded that Petrol
Plus could not recover under the
UCC warranty provisions, since
GM, by definition, was not a "seller."
Petrol Plus also argued it should
receive indemnification based on
the common law theory of warranty. However, the court determined
that a party would have to establish
significant involvement in the
stream of commerce to recover
under this theory. The court found
that Petrol Plus did not prove this
threshold participation by GM.
The court thus rejected Petrol
Plus's indemnification claim based
on a common law warranty theory.
Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act
CUTPA, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4211 Ob(a) (1985), provides that "no
person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce." In its definition of trade or
commerce, the statute includes advertising, selling, and distributing
goods. Once again, the court held
that GM did not fit the statutory
definition. GM did not advertise
the Dexron II transmission fluid
nor did it sell or distribute the
defective transmission fluid. Thus,
the Connecticut Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's refusal to
charge the jury with respect to
Petrol Plus's CUTPA claim.
Suzanne Kuzmenka

Volume 3 Number 2/Winter, 1991

Investors Who Relied
On Tax Opinions May
Not Recover Back
Taxes And Interest Paid
For Disallowed
Deductions
In Alpert v. Shea Gould Climenko
& Casey, 559 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1990),
the Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division denied recovery to investors of back taxes and
interest which they were required
to pay to the Internal Revenue
Service after the deductions they
took were disallowed. The investors had relied on the opinions of
two law firms and invested in a
coal mining tax shelter. In addition, the court held that the investors could not amend their complaints to assert additional claims
for fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty.
Background
On December 16, 1977, the
United States Treasury Department ("Treasury") amended one
of its regulations to disallow deductions from gross income for
advance minimum royalty payments in connection with mineral
properties. Treas. Reg. § 1.6123(b)(3) (1977). An advance minimum royalty is a fixed amount of
money to be paid to the owner of
mineral property before mining
begins, as opposed to periodic royalty payments made in proportion
to the amount of minerals mined.
Three days later, the Internal Revenue Service ("I.R.S.") revised a
revenue ruling to provide that taxpayers may not take an immediate
deduction for the full amount of
the advance minimum royalty payment but must take deductions for
such payments only in the year in
which the corresponding minerals
are extracted. Rev. Rul. 77-489,
1977 I.R.B. 51.
Prior to these Treasury and
I.R.S. releases, Esanu, Katsky and
Korins (the "Esanu firm"), a law
firm, had structured Logan Properties Program ("Logan"), a coal
mining business. Logan appeared
to provide investors an opportunity for immediate deduction of an

advance minimum royalty to be
paid by Logan. By December 21,
1977, following publication of the
government releases, the Esanu
firm withdrew its opinion with
respect to the Logan investment
program. The Esanu firm advised
the operating manager of Logan
that while there was a basis in law
for taxpayers to deduct Logan's
advance minimum royalty payment, there was also a significant
chance that the I.R.S. would disallow such a deduction in part or in
full.
Logan then asked Shea Gould
Climenko and Casey ("Shea
Gould") for an opinion letter to be
included in its promotion materials. On December 20, 1977, Shea
Gould opined that there was a
reasonable basis for concluding
that the revenue ruling was invalid.
However, Shea Gould advised that
taxpayers who invested in Logan
might, nevertheless, would be unable to deduct the advance minimum royalty payment immediately upon investing in Logan if the
I.R.S. successfully applied the distortion of income concept.
On December 30, 1977, George
Alpert ("Alpert") and Lee Wolfman ("Wolfman") each invested
$52,500 in Logan. Alpert and
Wolfman based these investment
decisions on the tax opinions of the
Esanu firm and Shea Gould. On
their 1977 tax returns, Alpert and
Wolfman each deducted $ 216,645
for advance minimum royalty payments for the right to mine coal.
On their 1978 returns, each deducted $10,893 for the advance
minimum royalty payments. In
1984 and 1985, the I.R.S. disallowed the deductions taken by Alpert and Wolfman in 1977 and
1978. Alpert and Wolfman had to
pay the tax deficiencies plus interest.
In 1984, Alpert and Wolfman
each commenced actions against
the advising law firms for fraudulent misrepresentation. In the lawsuits, Alpert and Wolfman sought
lost profits and recovery of the tax
benefits they would have received if
they had not relied on the opinions
of the Esanu firm and Shea Gould
and had instead invested in a viable
tax shelter. Alpert and Wolfman
(continued on page 72)
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also sought the interest they were
required to pay on the back taxes.
The two actions were combined for
consideration by the Supreme
Court, New York County.
Supreme Court, New York County
The lower court dismissed the
claims of Alpert and Wolfman for
back taxes but allowed recovery of
the interest paid on the deficient
taxes. Further, the court allowed
the investors to amend their complaints to assert an additional
claim of breach of fiduciary duty
but denied them leave to amend
their complaints to include an additional cause of action in fraud.
Supreme Court, Appellate
Division
On appeal, the court first rejected the damage claims of Alpert and
Wolfman for back taxes. The court
stated that the recovery of damages
for fraud is limited to that which is
necessary to restore a party to the
position occupied before commission of the fraud. The court noted
that the victim of fraud may not
recover the benefit of an alternative agreement overlooked in favor
of the fraudulent one. Therefore,
the court denied Alpert and Wolfson recovery of back taxes in this
case because such recovery would
place the investors in a far better
position than had they never invested in Logan.
Additionally, the court denied
Alpert and Wolfman leave to
amend their complaints to assert
an additional cause of action in
fraud against the Esanu firm which
had structured Logan. The original
complaint alleged only that the
Esanu firm's opinion was knowingly false, while the proposed amended complaint alleged that the facts
in the Logan offering memorandum were false. The court denied
leave to amend because the original complaint did not give the
proper notice necessary to enable
the Esanu firm to prepare a defense
since the complaint did not sufficiently state the circumstances surrounding the amended fraud
claim. In addition, such an amend72

ment would require supplemental
discovery that would result in prejudicial delay of the case. Therefore, the court denied leave to
amend to include a second cause of
action in fraud.
As to the issue of recovery of
interest paid on the deficient taxes,
the court held that recovery of
interest must be denied. The court
cited a case in which the United
States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found that a defrauded investor in a coal mine tax
shelter was not allowed to recover
interest paid to the I.R.S. upon
disallowance of tax deductions.
That court reasoned that such interest did not constitute damages
suffered by the investor but rather
was a payment to the I.R.S. for the
investor's use of the money during
the period when he was not entitled to it. The New York court
adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit. The court also reasoned that it was more equitable to
bar recovery of interest rather than
to allow the investors the windfall
of both having used the tax monies
for seven years and recovering all
interest thereon.
Lastly, the court denied leave to
amend the complaints to include
assertions of breach of fiduciary
duty because there was no support
for the conclusion that such a
fiduciary relationship existed between Alpert and Wolfman and the
Esanu firm and Shea Gould in the
absence of a contractual relationship between the parties. The court
used a three-prong test to determine whether professionals, such
as the defendant law firms, would
be liable for negligence for inaccurate reports. Under the test, (1) the
professional must have been aware
that the reports were to be used for
a particular purpose, (2) there must
have been a known party who
intended to rely on the reports for
furtherance of a purpose, and (3)
there must have been some conduct on the part of the professional
evidencing his knowledge of the
other party's reliance on the report.
In this case, the court held that
Alpert and Wolfman failed to satisfy the test because there was no
evidence that the Esanu firm and
Shea Gould were aware that the
potential investors would rely on

their tax opinion letters or that
Alpert and Wolfson, in particular
would. The class of potential investors was neither fixed nor identifiable.
Astrid E. Ellis

Imposing Penal
Sanctions For Breach Of
Home Improvement
Contract, In The
Absence of Fraud, Is
Involuntary Servitude
In State v. Brownson, 459
N.W.2d 877 (Wis. App. 1990), the
Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
held that the state, absent some
indicia of fraud or misrepresentation, may not impose penal sanctions for breach of a labor contract.
The court held that doing so constitutes the type of involuntary servitude prohibited by the United
States and Wisconsin Constitutions. The court also held that
challenges to a statute based upon
the "overbreadth doctrine" must
be linked to a first amendment
claim, and that the state, in criminal proceedings, need not prove
intent unless it is a statutorily
required element of the crime alleged.
Background
James Brown ("Brown") asked
William Brownson ("Brownson")
to build a garage. Brownson was
the general manager of Professional Workers Construction
("PWC"). In a written home improvement contract, the two men
agreed that Brownson, through
PWC, would build the garage for
$5,525.00. Brown made a down
payment of twenty percent of the
garage's total cost and additional
payments of $3,315.00 and
$826.80. Brownson never completed the garage. One unpaid materialman filed notice of intent to file
a lien.
In May 1990, the Circuit Court
of Outagamie County, Wisconsin
convicted Brownson of violating
three provisions of the Wisconsin
Administrative Code: (1) § Ag
110.05(2)(d), failure to include the
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